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The  paper  distinguishes  three  types  of  poverty  --  mass  poverty, 
conjunctural  poverty  and  destitution  --  from  the  historical  record,  and  how 
they  have  been  dealt  with.  It  emphasizes  that  the  only  cure  for  mass 
poverty  is  modern  economic  growth.  It  outlines  the  ethical  underpinnings  of 
two  different  perspectives  for  dealing  with  problems  of  destitution  and 
conjunctural  poverty.  The  final  two  parts  of  the  paper  survey  the  empirical 
evidence  on  the  success  of  the  efficient  labor-intensive  growth,  and  the 
evidence  from  the  Lal-Myint  comparative  study  of  the  results  from  the 
creation  of  welfare  states  in  some  Third  World  countries  --  the  so-called 
direct  route  to  poverty  alleviation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  primarily  summarizes  the  findings  on  poverty  and  development 
from  a  21  country  comparative  study  of  the  political  economy  of  poverty, 
equity  and  growth  that  Hal  Myint  and  I  have  conducted  for  the  World  Bank 
over  the  past  seven  years.  '  Given  the  limitations  of  space  various  import- 
ant  questions  concerning  measurement  issues  are  ignored.  2 
The  paper  is  in  four  parts.  In  the  first  part  three  different  causes 
of  poverty  are  identified  from  the  historical  record,  and  the  ways  they  have 
been  dealt  with  are  briefly  outlined.  The  second  part  outlines  two  differ- 
ent  perspectives  and  their  ethical  underpinnings  for  dealing  with  problems 
of  destitution  and  what  has  been  labelled  conjunctural  poverty.  The  third 
part  looks  at  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  so-called  indirect  route  to  the 
alleviation  of  structural  or  mass  poverty-the  promotion  of  efficient  labor 
intensive  growth.  The  final  part  examines  the  evidence  from  the  Lal-Myint 
studies  of  the  results  from  the  creation  of  welfare  states  in  some countries 
in  the  Third  World.  This  is  the  implicit  aim  of  the  so-called  "direct" 
route  to  poverty  alleviation.  It  pays  particular  attention  to  questions  of 
political  economy. 
I.  THREE  TYPES OF  POVEETY 
Structural  Mass  Poverty 
For  most  of  his  history  poverty  has  been  the  natural  state  of  Man. 3 
Until  the  end  of  the  19th  century  when  the  power  of  the  Unbound  Promethus 
was  at  last  becoming  manifest  with  the  rolling  Industrial  Revolution,  few 
economists  held  out  the  prospect  of  alleviating  mass  poverty.  Classical 
economics  with  its  law  of  diminishing  returns  and  the  Halthusian  principle 
of  population  predicted  a  long  run  stationary  state  where  the  mass  of  people 
languished  at  a  subsistence  standard  of  living.  This  as  Wrigley  (1988)  has 2 
shown  in  a  brilliant  book  was  due  to  their  belief  that  they  were  still 
concerned  with  the  age-old  problem  of  the  development  of  an  organic  economy, 
which  Wrigley  defines  as  "an  economy  bounded  by  the  productivity  of  land" 
(P.  5).  In  such  an  economy  --  and  historically  this  has  been  the  dominant 
type  over  the  globe  --  there  is  a  universal  dependence  on  organic  raw 
materials  for  food,  clothing,  housing  and  fuel.  Their  supply  is  in  the  long 
run  inevitably  constrained  by  the  fixed  factor  --  land.  This  was  also  true 
of  traditional  industry  and  transport.  Most  metal  working  industries  were 
dependent  upon  charcoal  (a  vegetable  substance)  for  smelting  and  working 
crude  ores.  Whilst: 
since  many branches  of  industry,  most  mining  ventures  and  almost 
all  forms  of  transport,  as  well  as  agriculture,  made extensive  use 
of  animal  muscle  as  a  source  of  mechanical  energy,  the  productiv- 
ity  of  land  was  crucial  to  the  supply  of  power  as  well  as  heat.  s 
Woodland  and  pasture  were  as  necessary  to  English  industry  as  her 
arable  land  was  to  the  family  table.  A  recognition  of  the 
significance  of  the  productivity  of  land  to  the  whole  range  of 
productive  activities  of  society  is  both  implicit  and  explicit  in 
the  writings  of  the  classical  economists,  and  the  leverage  which 
the  application  of  the  principle  of  declining  marginal  returns 
thus  exacted  was  very  powerful.  (pp.  18-19) 
The  system  of  "capitalism"  and  free  trade  outlined  and  defended  by  Adam 
Smith  could  increase  the  productivity  of  the  organic  economy  somewhat  over 
what  it  was  under  mercantilism.  It  would  also  help  the  poor  by  lowering  the 
cost  of  their  consumption  bundle,  whilst  boosting  their  wages  as  producers, 
but  if  this  increase  in  popular  opulence  led  to  excessive  breeding,  the  land 
constraint  would  inexorably  lead  back  to  subsistence  wages.  Technical  prog- 
ress  could  hold  the  stationary  state  at  bay  but  the  land  constraint  would 
ultimately  prove  binding. 
The  Industrial  Revolution  led  to  the  substitution  of  this  organic 
economy  by  a  mineral  based  energy  economy.  But  this  fundamental  change  was 
only  becoming  apparent  towards  the  mid-19th  century  in  England,  and  it  was 3 
not  until  Marx  was  writing  that  it  had  become  manifest.  This  new  economic 
regime  "escaped  from  the  problem  of  the  fixed  supply  of  land  and  of  its 
organic  products  by  using  mineral  raw  materials"  --  in  particular  coal.  It 
began  to  provide  most  of  the  heat  energy  of  industry,  and  with  the  develop- 
ment  of  the  steam  engine  virtually  unlimited  supplies  of  mechanical  energy. 
"The  prospects  for  growth  both  in  aggregate  output  and  in  output  per  head 
were  entirely  transformed  from  those  which  had  always  previously  obtained" 
(Wrigley,  pp.  5-6). 
Thus  the  Industrial  Revolution  in  England  was  based  on  two  forms  of 
"capitalism",  one  institutional,  namely  that  defended  by  Adam Smith  -- 
because  of  its  productivity  enhancing  effects,  even  in  an  organic  economy  -- 
and  the  other  physical:  the  capital  stock  of  stored  energy  represented  by 
the  fossil  fuels  which  allowed  mankind  to  create  a 
world  that  no  longer  follows  the  rhythm  of  the  sun  and  the 
seasons;  a  world  in  which  the  fortunes  of  men depend  largely  upon 
how he  himself  regulates  the  economy  and  not  upon  the  vagaries  of 
weather  and  harvest;  a  world  in  which  poverty  has  become  an 
optional  state  rather  than  a  reflection  of  the  necessary 
limitations  of  human productive  powers.  Wrigley,  P.  6) 
Not  only  the  subsequent  experience  of  the  First,  but  of  many  countries 
in  the  Third  World  has  borne  this  out.  It  is  possible  as  many  countries  in 
Southeast  Asia  for  instance  have  shown  to  eradicate  mass  poverty  within  a 
generation,  because  neither  of  the  twin  foundations  of  the  gloomy  classical 
prognostications,  diminishing  returns  (see  Scott  (1989)),  nor  the  Malthusian 
principle  (see  Birdsall  (1989))  on  the  demographic  transition)  are  secure. 
A  liberal  economic  order  which  promotes  labor  intensive  growth  can  cure  the 
age  long  problem  of  structural  mass  poverty.  4 
This,  however,  has  led  to  concerns  about  two  different  sources  of 
poverty  --  that  of  destitution,  and  of  those  who due  to  conjunctural  prob- 
lems  find  themselves  temporarily  in  poverty.  Both  these  sources  of  poverty 4 
have  existed  over  millennia  though  the  sources  of  conjunctural  problems  have 
changed. 
Destitution 
It  is  worth  noting  that,  traditionally,  when mass  structural  poverty 
was  the  norm  for  mankind,  the  problem  of  "poverty"  was  seen  as  being  confin- 
ed  essentially  to  destitution  (see  Himmelfarb,  1983;  Iliffe,  1987).  As 
until  fairly  recently  most  organic  economies  have  also  been  labor  scarce  and 
land  abundant  economies,  the  primary  cause  for  people  falling  into  destitu- 
tion  was  a  lack  of  labor  power  (either  their  own  --  because  for  instance  of 
physical  disabilities  --  or  from  family  members  --  because  they  have  no 
families)  to  work  the  land.  This  remains  a  major  source  of  destitution  in 
land-abundant  parts  of  Africa  (Iliffe,  op  cit.,  p.  4).  In  this  world  the  _  I 
poor  are  the  destitute  who  are  recognized  as  "deserving",  whilst,  as  the 
Elizabethan  poor  law  noted,  any  "able-bodied"  poor  were  to  be  classified  as 
vagrants.  5 
With  population  expansion  and  the  emergence  of  land  scarce  economies  in 
Europe  and  in  many  parts  of  Asia,  there  arose  "the  poverty  of  the  able-bod- 
ied  who  lacked  land,  work,  or  wages  adequate  to  support  the  dependents  who 
were  partly  responsible  for  their  poverty"  (Iliffe,  p.  5).  Their  poverty 
merges  with  the  mass  structural  poverty  we had  discussed  before,  and  growth 
will,  as  it  has,  lead  to  its  amelioration. 
Coniunctural  Poverty 
This  leaves  conjunctural  poverty.  For  most  of  history,  as  economies 
have  been  organic  agrarian  economies,  this  form  of  poverty  was  linked  to 
climatic  crises  or  political  turmoil.  Its  most  dramatic  manifestation  vas 
in  the  form  of  a  famine.  Since  the  Indian  Famine  Code was  devised  by  the 
British  Raj  in  the  late  19th  century,  it  has  been  known  that  to  deal  with what  Sen  (1982)  labels  "entitlement  failures"  which  precipitate  a  famine,  it 
is  necessary  for  the  government  to  provide  income  directly  (through  public 
works  or  food  for  work  schemes  for  instance)  to  those  who have  suffered  this 
temporary  loss  of  income  generating  employment.  As  the  Indian  example 
shows,  except  for  one  exception  this  administrative  solution  has  eliminated 
famines.  But  this  solution  does  require  political  stability  and  a  relative- 
ly  competent  administration.  Without  these  it  is  not  feasible.  6 
Hence,  nowadays,  famines  are  caused  by  politics.  This  is  supported  by 
examining  the  major  post  war  famines:  the  one  in  China  followed  the  politi- 
cal  Great  Leap  Forward,  and  has  been  described  as  the  worst  in  human 
history,  costing  63  million  lives  (actual  and  prospective  --  through  lost  or 
postponed  births)  (see  Lin  (1990));  the  Sudanese  and  Eritriean  famines,  were 
due  to  civil  wars  in  which  famine  was  a  political  weapon  used  by  the  State 
against  secessionists;  and  the  Somali  famine  which  has  resulted  from  the 
collapse  of  that  country  into  a  Hobbesian  state  of  nature. 
Finally,  the  Industrial  Revolution  has  introduced  its  own  source  of 
conjunctural  poverty  in  the  form  of  the  trade  cycle  and  the  unemployment 
that  ensues  in  its  downturns. 
Historically,  the  destitute  poor  survived  through  four  means.  The 
first  were  through  institutions  like  the  Church  which  took  one  of  its 
primary  tasks  to  be  the  care  of  the  poor.  Individual  charity  provided  a 
second  means,  whilst  a  third  was  organization  by  the  poor  themselves,  either 
by  underworld  groupings  or  by  self-help  organizations  like  rotating  credit 
associations.  "Finally,  historians  have  stressed  that  the  poor  relied  less 
on  institutions  or  organizations  than  on  their  own  efforts,  devious,  ugly, 
cruel,  and  dishonest  as  these  might  be."  (Iliffe  ,p.  7) 6 
Various  implicit  forms  of  insurance  embodied  in  interlinked  contracts 
in  factor  markets,  have  historically  been  the  major  way  of  dealing  with 
conjunctural  poverty  in  traditional  village  economies.  (See  Platteau  (1991) 
for  a  survey  and  references  to  this  literature.)  They  are  still  of  import- 
ance  in  the  highly  risky  environment  faced  by  rural  agents  in  many parts  of 
South  Asia  (see  Bardhan  (1980)  for  a  survey). 
II.  TWO  ETHICAL AND POLITICAL  TBADITIONS AND POVERTY  ALLEVIATION 
All  these  traditional  ways  of  dealing  with  destitution  and  conjunctural 
poverty  were  gradually  superseded  in  most  Western  societies  by  the  evolution 
of  the  Welfare  State.  As  the  socialist  impulse,  strengthened  by  the  appeal 
of  Marxism  in  the  late  19th  century,  provided  an  important  intellectual 
impetus  to  these  developments  (see  Himmelfarb  op.  cit.),  not  surprisingly  -  v 
the  socialist  ethic  of  egalitarianism  got  muddled  with  the  age-long  impulse 
to  alleviate  absolute  poverty,  Its  apotheosis  were  the  socialist  economies 
that  were  set  up  in  the  Soviet  Union,  China  and  Eastern  Europe,  and  which 
sought  to  subserve  this  end  by  socializing  the  means of  production.  The 
Western  socialists  who  advocated  welfare  states,  by  contrast,  sought  to 
socialize  the  results  of  production.  I  have  dealt  with  the  problems  of 
designing  a  social  policy  once  the  collapse  of  socialist  economies  has 
discredited  their  brand  of  egalitarianism,  in  an  earlier  conference  at  this 
Institute  (La1  (1992)).  So  I  can  be  brief  in  outlining  the  essential  ethi- 
cal  and  thence  policy  differences  which  underlie  the  continuing  tension 
between  Western  socialists  seeking  to  equalize  people  --  albeit  within  the 
context  of  a  market  economy,  and  classical  liberals  who  see  the  two  ends  of 
poverty  alleviation  and  egalitarianism  as  distinct. Classical  Liberalism 
For  the  classical  liberal  it  is  a  contingent  fact  that  there  is  no 
universal  consensus  on  what  a  "just"  or  "fair"  income  distribution  should 
be,  despite  the  gallons  of  ink  spilt  by  moral  philosophers  on  trying  to 
justify  their  particular  prejudices  as  the  dictates  of  Reason.  Egalitarian- 
ism  is  therefore  to  be  rejected  as  the  norm  for  deriving  principles  of 
public  policy  (see  the  essays  in  W.  Letwin  (1983))  for  reasons  why 
egalitarianism  is  incoherent,  and  Hayek  (1988)  for  why  it  is  incompatible 
with  a  market  order). 
This  does  not  mean  that  classical  liberals  are  immoral!  The  greatest 
of  them  all  Adam  Smith  after  all  wrote  The  Moral  Sentiments.  Both  of  the 
great  moral  philosophers  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  --  Smith  and  Hume -- 
recognized  benevolence  as  the  primary  virtue,  but  they  also  noted  its  scarc- 
ity.  However,  as  Smith's  other  great  work  The  Wealth  of  Nations  showed, 
fortunately,  a  market  economy which  promotes  "opulence"  does  not  depend  on 
this  virtue  for  its  functioning.  It  only  requires  a  vast  number  of  people 
to  deal  and  live  together  even  if  they  have  no  personal  relationships,  as 
long  as  they  do  not  violate  the  "laws  of  justice".  The  resulting  commercial 
society  promotes  some virtues  (what  Shirley  Letwin  (1992)  has  labelled  the 
"vigorous  virtues")  --  hard  work,  prudence,  thrift  and  self-reliance  -- 
which  as  they  benefit  the  agent  rather  than  others  are  inferior  to  altruism. 
But,  by  promoting  general  prosperity,  these  lower  level  virtues  do  uninten- 
tionally  help  others.  Hence,  the  resulting  society  is  neither  immoral  or 
amoral. 
Thus  a  good  government  is  one  which  promotes  opulence  through  a  policy 
of  promoting  natural  liberty  by  establishing  laws  of  justice  which  guarantee 
free  exchange  and  peaceful  competition.  The  improvement  of  morality  being 8 
left  to  non-governmental  institutions.7  But  since  Smith,  down  to  Friedman 
and  Hayek,  classical  liberals  have  also  recognized  that  society  or  the  State 
should  seek  to  alleviate  absolute  poverty,  which  as  Friedman  has  argued  has 
a  public  goods  aspect  to  it  (see  Friedman  (1962)  p.  191).  Like  the  other 
public  goods  --  law  and  order,  defense,  a  sound  currency  --  it  is  necessary 
to  ensure  that  the  State  provides  them  at  least  cost  (in  terms  of  revenue) 
and  that  it  does  not  expand  beyond  these  limits  into  a  revenue  maximizing 
Leviathan. 
On the  classical  liberal  view,  therefore,  there  is  an  externality, 
whereby  "the  recipient's  consumption  of  particular  goods  or  services  (food, 
education,  medical  care,  housing)  or  his  attainment  of  certain  states  (being 
better  nourished,  better  educated,  healthier,  better  housed)  that  are  close- 
: 
ly  correlated  with  an  'adequate  consumption  of  such  goods"  (Harberger 
(1984))  enters  the  donor's  utility  function.  As  it  is  the  specific  consump- 
tion  of  these  commodities,  not  the  recipient's  "utility"  which  enters  the 
donor's  utility  function,  there  is  no  "utility"  handle  which  can  be  used  as 
on  the  alternative  distributivist  view  to  allow  distributional  considera- 
tions  to  be  smuggled  into  the  analysis  of  poverty  alleviation  programs. 
Thus  the  indigent  and  the  disabled  are  to  be  helped  through  targeted 
benefits.  For  various  merit  goods-  health,  education  and  possibly  housing 
--  these  involve  in-kind  transfers.  This  is  very  much  the  type  of  social 
policy  package  that  was  implemented  in  Pinochet's  Chile,  and  which  succeeded 
not  only  in  protecting  the  poor  during  Chile's  arduous  transformation  to  a 
liberal  market  economy,  but  also  led  to  dramatic  long-term  improvements  in 
its  various  social  indicators  (see  Castaneda  (1992)  for  a  detailed  account 
of  these  social  policy  reforms  and  their  outcome). 9 
Distributivist  Egalitarianism 
The  alternative  technocratic  approach  to  poverty  alleviation  is  by 
contrast  necessarily  infected  with  egalitarianism  because  of  its  lineage. 
At  its  most  elaborate  it  is  based  on  some Bergson-Samuelson  type  social 
welfare  function.  Given  the  ubiquitous  assumption  of  diminishing  marginal 
utility  underlying  the  approach,  any  normative  utility  weighting  of  the 
incomes  of  different  persons  or  households  leads  naturally  to  some  form  of 
egalitarianism.  But  this  smuggling  in  of  an  ethical  norm  which  is  by  no 
means  universally  accepted  leads  to  a  form  of  "mathematical  politics". 
Poverty  alleviation  becomes  just  one  component  of  the  general  problem  of 
maximizing  social  welfare,  where  given  the  distributional  weighting  schema, 
all  the  relevant  tradeoffs  between  efficiency  and  equity,  including  inter- 
temporal  ones  can  be  derived  in  terms  of  the  appropriate  distribution  cum  - 
efficiency  shadow  prices  (see  Little-Mirrlees  (1974),  La1  (1981)).  If  the 
concern  is  solely  with  those  falling  below  some normative  "poverty  line", 
this  merely  implies  a  different  set  of  weights  with  the  weight  of  unity  say 
to  changes  in  consumption  (income)  above  the  line,  and  increasing  weights  to 
those  who  fall  progressively  below  the  poverty  line.  (See  Ravaillion  (1992) 
for  a  full  explication  of  this  approach  in  the  design  and  evaluation  of 
poverty  alleviation  programs  in  the  Third  World.) 
But  this  is  a  thin  edge  of  a  very  big  wedge,  as  far  as  the  defenders  of 
the  market  economy  are  concerned.  Besides  leading  to  recommendations  for 
all  sorts  of  redistributive  schemes,  it  also  leads  to  a  vast  increase  in 
dirigisme.  To  alleviate  poverty,  an  end  embraced  by  classical  liberals, 
they  are  on  this  route  being  led  to  endorse  the  creation  of  a  vast  Transfer 
State,  which  in  the  long  run  is  incompatible  with  the  preservation  of  a 
market  economy  (see  below). 10 
The  State  as  an  EnterDrise  versus  Civil  Association 
Reinforcing  the  different  ethical  perspectives  from  which  the  divergent 
programs  for  poverty  alleviation  on  the  classical  liberal  and  the  technocra- 
tic-distributivist  programs  emerge,  are  two  divergent  views  about  the  role 
of  the  State  and  its  relationship  to  society.  As  indigenous  political 
traditions  in  most  of  the  non-Western  world  have  been  snuffed  out  by  those 
deriving  from  the  West,  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  is  two  alternative 
Western  conceptions  of  the  State  which  are  now  in  contention  worldwide. 
In  a  brilliant  historical  analysis  of  the  origins  of  the  Western  State, 
Michael  Oakeshott  (1975)  has  argued  that  these  two  conceptions  of  the  State, 
have  deep  roots  in  Western  thought.  One view  which  goes  back  to  ancient 
Greece,  views  the  State  as  a  civil  association.  The  State  is  seen  as  the 
z 
custodian  of  laws  which  do  not  seek  to  impose  any  preferred  pattern  of  ends 
(including  abstractions  such  as  the  general  (social)  welfare,  or  fundamental 
rights),  but  which  merely  facilitates  individuals  to  pursue  their  own ends. 
This  view  has  been  challenged  by  the  rival  conception  of  the  State  as  an 
enterprise  association  --  a  view  which  has  its  roots  in  the  Judaeo-Christian 
tradition.  The  State  is  now  seen  as  the  manager  of  an  enterprise  seeking  to 
use  the  law  for  its  own  substantive  purposes,  and  in  particular  for  the 
legislation  of  morality.  The  classical  liberalism  of  Smith  and  Hume entails 
the  former,  whilst  the  major  secular  embodiment  of  society  viewed  as  an 
enterprise  association  is  socialism,  with  its  moral  aim  of  using  the  State 
to  equalize  people. 
The  efficacy  of  any  State  viewed  as  an  enterprise  association 
(particularly  of  a  benevolent  kind)  in  serving  the  public  weal  is  undermined 
by  the  implausibility  of  the  assumption  it  makes  about  the  character  of  its 
agents.  The  philosophers  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  were  clearheaded 11 
about  the  implausibility  of  viewing  the  State  as  a  committee  of  Platonic 
Guardians.  As  Hume wrote  in  his  essay  "Of  the  Independence  of  Parliament": 
Political  writers  have  established  it  as  a  maxim  that,  in 
contriving  any  system  of  government  and  fixing  the  several  checks 
and  controls  of  the  constitution,  every  man ought  to  be  supposed  a 
knave  and  to  have  no  other  end,  in  all  his  actions,  than  private 
interest.  By  this  interest  we must  govern  him  and,  by  means  of 
it,  make him,  notwithstanding  his  insatiable  avarice  and  ambition, 
co-operate  to  public  good.  Without  this,  say  they,  we  shall  in 
vain  boast  of  the  advantages  of  any  constitution  and  shall  find  in 
the  end  that  we  have  no  security  for  our  liberties  or  possessions 
except  the  goodwill  of  our  rulers;  that  is  we  shall  have  no 
security  at  all. 
It  is  therefore,  a  just  political  maxim  that  every  man must  be 
supposed  a  knave,  though  at  the  same  time  it  appears  somewhat 
strange  that  a  maxim  should  be  true  in  politics  which  is  false  in 
fact.  But  to  satisfy  us  on  this  head  we  may consider  that  men are 
generally  more  honest  in  their  private  than  their  public  capacity, 
and  will  go  greater  lengths  to  serve  a  party  than  when  their  own 
private  interest  is  alone  concerned. 
To  which  we  may add  that  every  court  or  senate  is  determined  by 
the  greater  number  of  voices,  so  that,  if  self-interest  influences  I- 
only  the  majority  (as  it  will  always  do),  the  whole  senate  follows 
the  allurements.of  this  separate  interest  and  acts  as  if  it 
contained  not  one  member who had  any  regard  to  public  interest  and 
liberty.  (Hendle  (ed.)  (1953),  p.  68) 
Hume as  we  shall  see  was  prescient  about  the  political  economy  of 
democratic  welfare  states. 
III.  GROWTH  INEQUALITY AND POVERTY  ALIXVIATION 
A  usual  riposte  to  the  classical  liberal  position  of  separating 
questions  of  alleviating  absolute  poverty  from  egalitarianism  is  that,  in 
theory,  a  market-based  growth  process  could  lead  to  such  a  worsening  of  the 
income  distribution,  that  instead  of  the  poor  seeing  a  rise  in  their  incomes 
as  part  of  the  growth  process,  they  could  be  immisserised.  This  view  was 
strengthened  by  the  so-called  Kuznets  hypothesis  which  stated  that,  inequal- 
ity  was  likely  to  worsen  in  the  early  stages  of  development  before  it 
declined,  with  per  capita  incomes  rising  towards  current  developed  country 
levels. 12 
All  the  empirical  evidence,  to  date,  is  against  the  Kuznets  hypothesis, 
and  its  corollary  that  growth  might  not  alleviate  absolute  mass  poverty.  In 
the  Lal-Myint  studies  the  country  authors  were  asked  to  fix  a  poverty  line 
at  the  nominal  income  of  the  lowest  20% of  the  income  distribution  in  the 
base  year  1950,  and  then  to  keep  this  absolute  country  specific  poverty  line 
constant  over  the  period  of  study.  They  were  then  asked  to  form  judgments 
on  how  the  headcount  index  of  poverty  had  moved  during  the  subsequent  35 
years,  with  the  fluctuations  in  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy.  As  no 
meaning  can  be  attached  to  inter-country  comparisons  in  the  changes  in  the 
resulting  headcounts,  the  only  interest  of  the  exercise  is  in  the  direc- 
tional  change  in  the  index  as  growth  rates  rose  or  fell  in  each  country. 
Table  1,  summarizes  the  evidence  from  the  country  studies.  From  this  it  is 
= 
evident  that  there  is  a  clear  positive  effect  of  per  capita  income  growth  on 
poverty  redressal,  but  not  for  reductions  in  income  inequality  (where  the 
pattern  is  extremely  mixed). 
Further  evidence  on  the  positive  association  between  poverty  redressal 
and  growth  was  provided  in  a  special  study  by  Fields  (1991)  which  formed 
part  of  the  Lal-Myint  comparative  study.  He put  together  the  available  data 
on  poverty  redressal  and  inequality  for  all  the  developing  countries  for 
which  it  is  available  subject  to  some minimal  criteria  of  consistency.  His 
results  on  poverty  and  growth  are  summarized  in  Table  2.  He  found  that  it 
is  true  in  most  but  not  all  cases  that  poverty  tends  to  decrease  with 
growth,  and  that  poverty  tends  to  decrease  most  the  more  rapid  is  economic 
growth.  Second,  he  finds  that  growth  has  not  had  a  demonstrably  greater 
effect  in  reducing  poverty  in  Asia  than  in  Latin  America,  but  rather  the 
available  evidence  supports  the  opposite  conclusion.  8 13 
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Table  1  (cont.) 
n.c.  =  no  change 
Poverty  and  Income  Inequality  trends  are  taken  from  the  country  studies. 
Source:  (1)  GDP  per  capita  growth  rates  are  taken  from  Table  2.1,  Col.  3. 
(II)  GDP  per  capita  growth  rates  are  calculated  from  country  study 
data  and  in  the  case  of  Nigeria  and  Ghana  from  World  Bank 
data  files. 15 
TABLE 2 
Change  in  Poverty  and  Rates  of  Growth, 
Spell  Analysis 
SDell 
Growth  Rate 
of  GNP  Chanee  in  Povertv 
A.  Change  in  Povert  s 
Jamaica  1973-1979 
Bangladesh  1966/67-1973/74 
Pakistan  1969/70-1979 
Sri  Lanka  1963-1973 
Bangladesh  1976/77-1981/82 
Sri  Lanka  1978/79-1981/82 
Sri  Lanka  1973-1978/79 
Korea  1976-1980 
Thailand  1968/69-1975/76 
Thailand  1975/76-1981 
Mexico  1963-68 
Indonesia  1978-1980 
Bangladesh  1973/74-1976/77 
Indonesia  1970-1976 
Jamaica  1968-73 
Indonesia  1976-1978 
Malaysia  1976-1979 
Malaysia  1970-1976 
Thailand  1962/63-1968/69 
Hong  Kong  1966-1971 
Singapore  1975-1980 
Hong  Kong  1971-1976 
Korea  1965-1970 
Korea  1970-1976 
Singapore  1966-1975 
Jamaica  1973-1979 
Sri  Lanka  1963-1973 
Bangladesh  1966/67-1973/74 
Pakistan  1969/70-1979 
Bangladesh  1973/74-1976/77 
Jamaica  1968-1973 
Sri  Lanka  1973-1978/79 
Thailand  1968/69-1975/76 
Mexico  1963-1968 
Malaysia  1970-1976 
Thailand  1962/63-1968/69 
Hong  Kong  1966-1971 
-4.3%  Poverty  increaged 
-2.1  Mixed  evidence 
1.7  Poverty  decreased 
2.2  Poverty  decreased 
2.4  Mixed  evidence* 
2.8  Mixed  evidence 
3.3  Poverty  decreased 
3.5  Poverty  decreased 
4.0  Poverty  decreased 
4.1  Poverty  decreased 
4.3  Poverty  decreased 
4.5  Poverty  decreased 
4.8  Poverty  increased 
4.8  Poverty  decreased 
4.9  Poverty  Increased 
4.9  Poverty  decreased 
4.9  Poverty  decreased 
5.0  Poverty  decreased 
5.2  Poverty  decreased 
5.4  Poverty  decreased 
5.8  Poverty  decreased 
7.3  Poverty  decreased 
7.6  Poverty  decreased 
7.8  Poverty  decreased 
8.8  Poverty  decreased 
B.  Change  in  Povertv  and  Growth  Rate  of  ICP 
-3.5%  Poverty  increased 
-2.1  Poverty  decreased 
-0.7  Mixed  evidence 
1.5  Poverty  decreased 
2.6  Poverty  increased 
3.0  Poverty  increased 
3.3  Poverty  decreased 
3.5  Poverty  decreased 
4.5  Poverty  decreased 
4.6  Poverty  decreased 
5.3  Poverty  decreased 
5.9  Poverty  decreased 16 
Table  2  (cont.) 
SDell 
Growth  Rate 
of  GNP  Chance  in  Poverty 
Indonesia  1970-1976 
Singapore  1975-1980 
Indonesia  1976-1978 
Korea  1970-1976 
Hong  Kong  1971-1976 
Indonesia  1978-1980 
Korea  1965-1970 
Singapore  1966-1975 
Malaysia  1976-1979 
6.0  Poverty  decreased 
6.3  Poverty  decreased 
6.5  Poverty  decreased 
6.6  Poverty  decreased 
6.7  Poverty  decreased 
7.2  Poverty  decreased 
8.6  Poverty  decreased 
8.8  Poverty  decreased 
9.7  Poverty  decreased 
* 
Poverty  increased  using  one  poverty  line  and  decreased  using  another. 
Sources:  For  change  in  poverty  -  Table  2  in  fields,  OD.  cit. 
Fields,  Table  8,  SPECSTUD 
For  growth  rates  of  GNP  -  Calculated  by  the  author  from  data  in 
IMF  Financial  Statistics  SuDDlement  #8,  pp.  18-21. 
For  growth  rates  of  ICP  -  Calculated  by  the  author  from  data  in 
Summers  and  Heston  (1984).  .  w 17 
On inequality  he  finds  that,  first,  there  is  no  systematic  tendency  for 
inequality  to  increase  with  economic  growth.  In  the  available  sample, 
inequality  increased  in  as  many  growth  episodes  as  it  decreased.  However, 
growth  tends  to  increase  inequality  more  often  in  Latin  America  than  in 
Asia.  Second,  he  finds  no  relationship  between  inequality  in  the  initial 
distribution  of  income  and  subsequent  growth  rates.  Nor  does  more  rapid 
growth  increase  inequality  -rather  the  converse  seems  to  hold.  Third,  he 
concludes  that  there  is  no  tendency  for  inequality  to  increase  in  the  early 
than  the  later  stages  of  development  --  this  refutes  the  Kuznets  hypothesis. 
Finally,  Squire  (1993)  reports  on  a  21  country  study  for  which 
comparable  data  on  income  distribution  were  available  for  two  points  of 
time.  Using  a  headcount  index  based  on  a  common poverty  line  in  1985  PPP 
.  . 
dollars  of  $370  per  person  a  year,  an  OLS regression  of  the  change  in  the 
head  count  index  (CHHI),  and  the  growth  in  mean expenditure  (G),  and  the 
initial  head  count  index  (HI),  yielded: 
CHHI -  -0.24G  -  O.OlHI  Adj  Rsq.  -  0.70 
(t  -  -4.06)  (t  -  -2.90)  N-21 
A  one  percent  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  mean income  increases  the 
annual  rate  of  decline  in  the  headcount  index  by  0.24  percentage  points. 
Also,  the  negative  sign  on  HI  refutes  the  Kuznets  hypothesis.  "At  least  for 
this  sample  it  appears  that  changes  in  inequality  worked  on  average  in  favor 
of  the  poor  . . .  and  that  this  effect  was  stronger  in  situations  where 
poverty  was  greater  at  the  start  of  the  period  of  observation"  (Squire,  p. 
378). 
The  distributivist  fears  that  the  classical  liberal  presumption  that 
growth  would  alleviate  poverty  would  be  vitiated  by  Kuznets  curve-type 
processes  turns  out  to  be  unfounded.  On the  existing  evidence  mass  poverty 18 
can  be  alleviated  by  concentrating  on  the  rapid  efficient  (labor  intensive) 
growth  promoted  by  a  market  economy,  and  we  need  not  worry  about  the 
distributional  consequences. 
IV.  WELFARE  STATES FOR THE THIRD WORLD? 
This  still  leaves  problems  of  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty 
which  are  likely  to  exist  even  if  growth  takes  account  of  the  alleviation  of 
mass  poverty.  Unlike  the  classical  liberals  who  (as  we  saw  in  Section  II) 
advocate  targeted  benefits  to  provide  merit  goods  to  these  "deserving  poor", 
the  socialist  distributivist  panacea  is  to  institute  Western  style  welfare 
states  with  the  universalization  of  benefits,  to  deal  with  problems  like 
insufficient  take-up,  and  the  costs  of  gathering  information  to  identify 
beneficiaries  (particularly  in  poor  countries  with  weak  administrative  z 
systems)  which  bedevil  the  targeting  of  benefits  (see  Atkinson  (1987), 
Glewwe  and  van  der  Gaag  (1988). 
But  it  has  also  been  argued  that  this  so  called  "direct  route"  should 
also  be  used  to  deal  with  what  we have  labelled  structural  mass  poverty.  In 
an  influential  paper  Sen  (1981)  had  argued  that  a  number  of  countries  (e.g., 
Sri  Lanka,  Costa  Rica)  had  succeeded  in  alleviating  poverty  despite  low 
growth  and  beyond  what  could  be  expected  with  comparators  with  similar  per 
capita  income  levels.  Bhalla  and  Glewwe  (1986),  Bhalla  (1988)  have  contest- 
ed  the  inferences  drawn  by  Sen  from  his  empirics,  essentially  on  the  grounds 
that  Sri  Lanka  had  already  achieved  high  levels  of  poverty  alleviation 
(based  on  various  social  indicators),  before  Independence.  Its  post-indep- 
endence  record  they  argue  was  worse  on  both  the  growth  and  poverty 
alleviation  indices  if  this  historical  adjustment  for  its  social  indicators 
was  made.  The  subsequent  debate  has  shed  more  heat  than  light  (see  Sen's 
response  and  Bhalla's  riposte  in  Bardhan  and  Srinvisan  (1988). 19 
Cross-Sectional  Evidence 
As  part  of  the  Lal-Myint  study  we  followed  Bhalla  in  estimating  a 
simple  cross-sectional  statistical  model  for  three  social  indicators  (the 
infant  mortality  rate,  life  expectancy,  and  the  physical  quality  of  life 
index  (PQLI)  due  to  Morrris  (1979)),  which  allows  the  performance  of  our 
sample  of  countries  to  be  judged  relative  to  each  country's  own initial 
conditions  (with  respect  to  each  indicator)  as  well  as  that  of  countries  at 
similar  levels  of  development  or  per  capita  income  (at  the  base  date)  (see 
Bhalla  (1988)  for  details  of  the  model). 
The  model  was  estimated  for  the  period  1960-86  for  the  three 
indicators.  Two  different  sets  of  comparators  were  used.  In  one,  countries 
in  the  same broad  income  class  low  income,  middle  income,  high  income,  as 
defined  by  the  World  Bank  were  used.  In  the  other  all  developing  countries 
were  taken  as  the  relevant  comparators.  The  results  were  not  very  different 
for  the  two  sets  of  comparators.  Figs.  1-3,  show  the  results  when  the 
comparator  was  "all  developing  countries".  Each  figure  shows  the  regression 
line  for  the  relationship  between  the  social  indicator  and  per  capita  GDP 
growth  rates  for  all  developing  countries.  The  countries  in  our  sample  are 
identified  by  self-explanatory  symbols.  If  a  country  lies  above  (below)  the 
line  then  its  performance  is  worse  (better)  than  its  comparators.  In  Fig.1, 
which  charts  the  child  (O-4years)  mortality  regression,  Egypt,  Indonesia, 
Uruguay  and  Mexico's  performance  is  below  par,  whilst  that  of  Singapore, 
Hong Kong,  Malaysia,  Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  Turkey  and  Peru  is  better  than 
expected.  In  Fig.2,  for  life-expectancy,  Uruguay,  Malawi,  Brazil  and 
Singapore's  performance  is  worse  than  expected,  whilst  that  of  Hong  Kong, 
Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  Malaysia,  Egypt,  Turkey,  Indonesia  and  Madagascar  is 
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PQLI  deficit  (from  a  notional  value  of  loo),  Uruguay,  Brazil,  Egypt, 
Nigeria,  Malawi  and  Ghana's  performance  was  distinctly  worse,  whilst  that  of 
Hong Kong,  Costa  Rica  and  Jamaica  is  very  much better,  as  is  possibly  that 
of  Thailand,  Colombia,  Turkey  and  Peru. 
Taking  all  three  figures  together,  it  appears  that  Jamaica,  Costa  Rica, 
Turkey  and  Hong  Kong  do  better  than  expected  on  these  social  indicators  and 
Uruguay  and  Brazil  worse.  As  the  two  ostensible  welfare  states  in  our 
sample  --  Uruguay  and  Costa  Rica  --  fall  on  either  side  of  the  dividing 
line,  as  do  two  of  the  relatively  "capitalist"  economies  --  Brazil  and  Hong 
Kong  --  it  is  apparent  that  the  type  of  support  such  cross-sectional  regres- 
sion  analyses  can  provide  to  those  who believe  that  poverty  redressal  re- 
quires  so-called  'direct'  government  intervention  is  virtually  non-existent. 
I- 
Evidence  From  Analytical  Economic  Histories 
The  Lal-Myint  comparative  study  therefore  placed  more  weight  on  the 
long  run  analytical  histories  of  the  interactions  between  growth,  poverty 
alleviation  and  the  political  economy  of  policy  interventions  in  determining 
the  qualitative  conclusions  about  the  relative  productivity  of  the  direct 
and  indirect  routes  to  poverty  alleviation  (see  Bhagwati  (1988)).  For  as  is 
obvious,  arguing  as  some proponents  of  the  establishment  of  welfare  states 
in  the  Third  World  have  done,  that  low  growth  countries  with  direct  poverty 
redressal  programs  have  been  successful  in  alleviating  poverty,  begs  a  num- 
ber  of  important  questions.  The  first  is  whether  the  direct  interventions 
lowered  growth  rates  (which  would  have  had  a  deleterious  effect  on  poverty 
redressal).  The  second  is  whether  the  resulting  welfare  entitlements  which 
alleviated  poverty  were  sustainable  in  a  low  growth  environment. 
Four  of  the  countries  in  the  Lal-Myint  sample  attempted  to  alleviate 
poverty  through  the  creation  of  politically  determined  entitlements  --  Sri 24 
Lanka,  Jamaica,  Uruguay,  Costa  Rica. 
The  oldest  and  most  notable  example  is  that  of  Uruguay.  It  established 
a  Western-style  welfare  state  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.  It  was 
financed  by  the  rents  from  the  main  export  crop  --  meat.  The  main  benefic- 
iaries  were  the  growing  urban  population  (with  more  than  half  of  the 
country's  population  being  concentrated  in  the  Hontevedio  metropolitan 
region).  With  the  passing  of  political  power  from  rural  caudillos  to  a 
two-party  system  of  government,  the  interests  of  these  urban  voters  came to 
dominate  the  polity.  They  demanded and  got  the  taxation  of  the  export  sec- 
tor  for  their  benefit.  This  was  accompanied  by  import  substitution  policies 
in  favor  of  urban  manufacturing  industries  in  response  to  powerful  trade 
union  pressure.  The  net  effect  of  the  welfare  system  and  of  the  system  of 
protection  was  to  distort  the  relative  prices  of  labor  and  capital,  raising- 
the  former  and  lowering  the  latter  (see  Rottenberg  et  al.  (1993)).  This  and 
the  growing  tax  burden  on  the  export  sector  led  to  a  prolonged  growth 
collapse,  with  GDP growth  of  less  than  1% p.a.  during  1955-73. 
Equally  serious  were  the  fiscal  consequences.  As  Favaro  and  Benison 
(in  Rottenberg  et  al.)  note,  the  tax  resources  available  from  a  stagnating 
economy were  unable  to  finance  an  explosive  increase  in  welfare  expendi- 
tures,  due  to  demographic  trends  related  to  the  ageing  of  the  population, 
and  the  increased  coverage  of  retirement  benefits.  Furthermore,  the  social 
security  system  came  to  be  unfunded,  as  its  reserves,  which  had  been  used  to 
purchase  public  debt  (itself  issued  to  finance  fiscal  imbalances),  were 
virtually  wiped  out  by  inflation.  The  fiscal  crisis  of  the  Uruguayan  state 
which  was  in  part  responsible  for  its  growth  collapse  was  thus  largely  due 
to  these  unsustainable  social  expenditures.  Thus  the  poor  growth  record  of 
Uruguay  (only  partially  reversed  with  the  partial  economic  reforms 25 
undertaken  since  1973)  can  in  part  be  blamed  on  the  redistributive 
"immobilisme"  and  inefficiencies  that  the  combination  of  its  welfare  state 
and  dirigiste  trade  and  anti-agricultural  policies  entailed. 
Costa  Rica's  development  of  a  welfare  state  and  its  likely  denouement 
seems  to  follow  Uruguay's  closely  by  about  three  decades.  Beginning  in  the 
late  1930s  and  early  194Os,  by  the  late  1970s  the  welfare  system  had  been 
expanded  to  provide  virtually  universal  social  security.  However  Gonzales- 
Vega  and  Cespedes  (in  Rotenberg  et  al.  (1993))  emphasize  that  most  of  the 
favorable  poverty  alleviation  and  equity  outcomes  were  in  place  by  the  late 
1960s.  As  in  Uruguay  the  expanding  welfare  state  was  financed  by  taxing  the 
rural  export  sector  in  favor  of  the  politically  dominant  urban  sector. 
Import  substitution  under  the  aegis  of  the  Central  American  Common  Market 
(CACM),  initially  raised  the  growth  rate  because  of  the  "trade  diversion" 
effects  of  the  customs  union.  With  the  disintegration  of  the  CACM in  the 
welter  of  regional  wars  in  Central  America  and  the  first  oil  shock,  Costa 
Rica's  situation  rapidly  deteriorated.  Her  government  budget  and  balance  of 
payments  came under  increasing  strain  under  the  twin  burdens  of  financing 
inefficient  public  enterprises  and  increasing  welfare  expenditures  and  sub- 
sidies.  GDP growth  dropped  to  2.9  % p.a.  barely  above  population  growth, 
and  when  coffee  prices  fell  in  1978  Costa  Rica  fell  over  the  brink  into  an 
economic  collapse  and  debt  crisis, 
The  poverty  alleviation  that  occurred  in  Costa  Rica  was  in  place 
according  to  Gonzalez  Vega  and  Cespedes  by  the  late  1960s.  It  was  due  first 
to  a  rapid  modern  sector  enlargement,  and  secondly  to  a  rapid  rise  in 
agricultural  productivity  promoted  by  infrastructure  investments  in  the 
1960s  --  which  helped  to  alleviate  poverty  in  the  rural  area  (where  poverty 
was  concentrated).  "Poverty  declined  from  about  50% of  the  population 26 
around  1961  to  somewhere  between  20  and  25% in  the  mid  1970s"  (Gonzalez-Vega 
and  Cespedes).  The  welfare  state  was  greatly  expanded  in  the  1960s  but  it 
only  became  universal  with  its  consolidation  and  universalization  in  the  mid 
1970s  after  the  declines  in  poverty  had  taken  place.  As  Gonzales  Vega  and 
Cespedes  note: 
Increased  income  equality  and  poverty  alleviation  were  the  result, 
for  most  of  the  period,  of  growth  itself  and  of  improvements  of 
the  labor  market.  Only  after  the  mid  1970s  did  explicit  redistri- 
bution  policies  play  a  major  role  in  explaining  equity  outcomes. 
The  impact  of  these  policies,  however,  was  mixed  . . .  when  external 
events  reduced  the  country's  purchasing  power,  excessive  entitle- 
ments  and  less  than  optimum  policies  contributed  to  retarded 
growth.  (P.  238) 
During  the  economic  crisis  in  the  1980s  poverty  increased  to  about  30% of 
the  population. 
In  both  the  Uruguayan  and  Costa  Rican  cases  therefore  whilst  there  was: 
undoubtedly  some poverty  alleviation  as  a  result  of  the  expansion  of  their 
welfare  states,  over  the  long  run  the  entitlements  they  created  damaged the 
growth  performance  of  the  country,  on  which  they  were  predicated,  and  hence 
eventually  became  unsustainable. 
Virtually  the  same  story  can  be  told  about  the  expansion  of  unviable 
social  expenditures  in  Sri  Lanka  and  Jamaica,  financed  by  taxing  growth-pro- 
moting  productive  activities,  which  have  killed  the  goose  that  laid  the 
golden  egg.  In  both  cases  the  improvements  in  poverty  indices  has  not  been 
sustainable. 
;a  e  0  C  e 
The  essential  point  which  the  Lal-Myint  country  studies  emphasize  can 
be  brought  out  by  noting  Sen  (1981)s  statement  (p.  309)  that:  "ultimately 
poverty  removal  must  come  to  grips  with  the  issue  of  entitlement  guaran- 
teesn;  and  that  whereas  the  'growth'  or  'indirect'  route  relies  on 27 
"successfully  fostered  growth  and  the  dynamism  of  the  encouraged  labor 
markets"  the  other  dirigiste  route  "gives  the  government  a  more  direct  role 
as  the  provider  of  provisions".  But  as  these  country  studies  show  there  are 
important  differences  in  the  nature  of  the  guarantee  provided  by  each  of 
these  alternative  ways  of  alleviating  poverty.  Not  all  guarantees  are 
equally  iron  clad!  The  security  of  politically  determined  entitlements  of 
the  poor  (in  for  instance  our  four  welfare  states)  has  come  increasingly 
into  question  as  the  inexorable  increase  in  their  costs  confronts  a  fixed 
economic  pie  from  which  they  can  be  financed  (in  part  resulting  from  the 
economic  stagnation  that  such  transfers  have  indirectly  fostered).  By 
contrast,  the  poverty  in  many  of  our  higher  growth  countries  (Hong  Kong, 
Thailand,  Indonesia,  for  instance)  which  has  been  alleviated  through  the 
rising  incomes  of  the  poor  cannot  be  so  readily  reversed  by  political  fiat.- 
For  these  entitlements  are  really  not  underwritten  by  the  State,  but  repre- 
sent  the  higher  returns  on  agents  endowments.  They  have  been  underwritten 
by  the  wealth  created  in  the  growth  process. 
Thus,  growth  is  the  only  certain  means  of  alleviating  mass  poverty. 
The  so-called  "direct  route"  does  not  really  offer  a  sustainable  alternat- 
ive,  and  by  damaging  growth  performance  could  instead  perpetuate  mass 
poverty. 
If  the  welfare  state  is  an  uncertain  instrument,  at  best,  for 
sustainable  mass  poverty  alleviation,  its  interactions  with  a  democratic 
polity  is  likely  to  turn  it  (when  used  to  deal  with  the  more  limited 
problems  of  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty)  into  a  transfer  state, 
which  following  "Directors  Law"  (see  Stigler  (1970)  is  likely  to  be  captured 
by  the  middles  class  (see  La1  (1992)  for  a  discussion  and  references  to  the 
literature).  Besides  posing  a  threat  to  the  survival  of  the  market  economy 28 
because  of  the  politicization  of  economic  life  it  entails,  it  also  leads  to 
a  deep  corruption  of  the  polity  and  society,  as  politicians  vie  with  each 
other  to  buy  votes  with  other  people's  money,  and  create  a  "dependency 
culture".  As  usual  that  farsighted  and  greatest  of  social  scientists,  De 
Tocqueville,  saw  this  with  clarity  in  his  little  known  reflections  on  the 
emerging  welfare  state  in  the  U.K.  In  his  Memoir  on  Pauoerism,  he 
concluded: 
I  am deeply  convinced  that  any  permanent,  regular,  administrative 
system  whose  aim  will  be  to  provide  for  the  needs  of  the  poor, 
will  breed  more  miseries  than  it  can  cure,  will  deprave  the 
population  that  it  wants  to  help  and  comfort,  will  in  time  reduce 
the  rich  to  being  no  more  than  the  tenant-farmers  of  the  poor, 
will  dry  up  the  sources  of  savings,  will  stop  the  accumulation  of 
capital,  will  retard  the  development  of  trade,  will  benumb human 
industry  and  activity,  and  will  culminate  by  bringing  about  a 
violent  revolution  in  the  State,  when  the  number  of  those  who 
receive  alms  will  have  become  as  great  as  those  who  give  it,  and 
the  indigent,  no  longer  being  able  to  take  from  the  impoverished 
rich  the  means  of  providing  for  his  needs,  will  find  it  easier  to 
plunder  them  of  all  their  property  at  one  stroke  than  to  ask  for 
their  help.  (Drescher  (ed.)  (1968)  pp.  24-25) 
The  major  qualification,  resulting  from  the  actual  operations  of 
majoritarian  democracies  that  De Tocqueville  did  not  foresee  results  from 
the  replacement  of  but  one  word  in  the  above,  instead  of  "indigent"  we now 
need  to  substitute  "middle  class"! 
As  Stigler  (1970),  and  Meltzer  and  Richards  (1981),  have  shown,  in  a 
majoritarian  democracy  where  the  median  voter  is  decisive,  the  redistribut- 
ive  pressures  for  a  "welfare  state"  will  exist  as  long  as  the  median  income 
is  below  the  mean,  and  with  income  being  redistributed  towards  median  income 
earners.  However,  because  of  the  deadweight  costs  of  taxation,  it  will  not 
be  in  the  interest  of  the  decisive  median  voter  to  expropriate  all  incomes 
above  the  median,  as  that  would  also  lower  total  income.  One implication  of 
this  theory  is  that,  with  economic  development,  the  thrust  towards  redistri- 
bution  ends  when  the  median  voter's  income  moves  towards  the  mean.  A 29 
conclusion  at  variance  with  even  the  most  casual  historical  evidence. 
A  richer  model  by  Peltzman  (1980)  repairs  this  lacunae.  It  uses  a 
variant  of  the  pressure  group  model  of  Becker  (1983),  and  hence  is  also 
applicable  to  polities  which  are  not  majoritarian  democracies.  The  major 
empirical  implications  of  Peltzman's  model  are  that  public  transfers:  (a) 
will  increase  if  there  is  greater  income  equality  within  the  beneficiary 
group ;  (b)  will  decrease  if  the  potential  beneficiaries'  incomes  increase 
relative  to  those  of  taxpayers;  (c)  will  increase  if  there  is  an  increase 
in  the  "ability"  of  the  two  groups  to  recognize  their  interests.  The 
greater  this  ability  amongst  the  beneficiary  group,  the  more  likely  that  the 
redistributive  benefits  will  accrue  to  the  poor.  Peltzman  fitted  this  model 
to  a  sample  of  developing  countries  and  found  it  provided  a  satisfactory  fit 
-0 
to  the  notoriously  imperfect  proxies  used  for  the  theoretical  variables.  We 
ran  a  similar  regression  for  17  of  our  countries  for  which  we had  data  in 
the  Lal-Myint  study,  and  again  found  some  support  for  the  Peltzman  model. 
This  suggests  that  once  the  interactions  of  the  polity  and  economy  are  taken 
into  account,  the  consequences  in  terms  of  the  size  of  the  transfer  state  as 
well  as  the  extent  of  poverty  alleviation  they  engender  may  be  very  differ- 
ent  from  those  predicted  by  purely  technocratic  analyses. 
More  serious  are  the  effects  of  the  welfare  state  on  what  De 
Tocqueville  called,  in  his  Democracy  in  America  "the  habits  of  the  heart"  -- 
the  cultural  underpinnings  for  both  a  democratic  society  and  the  market 
economy.  The  most  sustained  though  controversial  critique  of  the  decadence 
in  private  habits  engendered  by  the  transfer  state  is  in  Murray  (1984)'s 
examination  of  the  results  of  the  U.S.  war  on  poverty.  The  cultural 
consequences  of  the  welfare  state  maybe  as  momentous  as  the  economic  or 
political  ones.  But  this  is  a  very  large  subject  beyond  the  scope  of  this 30 
9  paper. 
For  our  purpose  we need  only  note  the  irony  in  the  fact  that  at  a  time 
when  the  welfare  state  is  coming  under  great  stress  because  of  its  "internal 
contradictions"  in  the  West  (see  La1  (1992)  for  references)  --  which  are 
very  similar  to  the  reasons  why  the  Third  World  welfare  states  discussed 
above  have  become  unviable  (see  La1  and  Wolf  (1986))  --  international 
institutions  such  as  UNICEF and  WIDER are  seeking  to  promote  their  extension 
in  the  Third  World.  Rather  than  seeking  ways  to  strengthen  traditional 
methods  of  dealing  with  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty,  and  finding 
new ways  of  fostering  the  civic  virtues  and  the  growth  of  civil  associa- 
tions,  on  which  (for  the  classical  liberal)  the  health  of  sustainable 
democracies  as  well  as  market  economies  depends,  a  vast  expansion  of 
universal  State  provision  for  major  components  of  expenditure  is  being 
sought.  This  is  not  likely  to  serve  the  cause  of  the  market  or  of  democracy 
in  the  Third  World. 
For  as  sociologists  such  as  Robert  Nisbet  (in  his  J'he Ouest  for 
Community)  have  noted,  the  conversion  of  welfare  into  transfer  states  in  the 
West,  and  their  inevitable  universalization  under  the  pressure  of  democratic 
politics  has  led  to  an  attack  on  civil  society  both  from  above  and 
below.  10  From  above  the  intermediate  institutions  of  civil  society  are 
forced  to  surrender  their  functions  and  authority  to  professional  elites  and 
the  bureaucracies  of  centralizing  States.  From  below,"rights-chatter"  -- 
the  clamor  for  numerous  and  newly  discovered  individual  rights-  undermines 
the  authority  of  those  traditional  civil  institutions  --  family,  church, 
school,  neighborhood  --  which  in  the  past  promoted  both  private  benevolence 
and  the  lower  order  "vigorous  virtues".  The  acceptance  of  claims  to  various 
welfare  rights,  substitutes  public  for  private  benevolence  --  sapping  the 31 
latter,  which  for  classical  liberals  is  the  highest  (though  scarce)  virtue. 
It  is  these  longer  run,  unintended,  social  (and  fiscal)  consequences  of  the 
Welfare  state,  which  are  now  leading  to  its  questioning  and  in  some cases 
partial  dismantling  in  the  West  --  the  most  dramatic  example  of  the  latter 
being  the  virtual  abandonment  of  the  New Zealand  welfare  state  by  its 
chastened  socialist  party! 
But  the  problem  of  dealing  with  destitution  and  conjunctural  poverty 
remains.  As  discussed  in  La1  (1992)  there  are  no  ideal  solutions.  Through 
the  targeting  of  benefits,  with  the  State  involved  in  their  finance  but 
rarely  in  their  provision,  and  with  the  decentralization  of  the  administra- 
tion  and  monitoring  of  the  benefit  system  preferably  to  various  non- 
governmental  civil  associations,  much  could  still  be  achieved.  But  this 
would  mean that  Chile,  not  Sri  Lanka,  or  Uruguay,  or  Costa  Rica  or  Jamaica, 
would  (on  the  basis  of  experience)  be  the  relevant  "model"  for  promoting 
both  growth  and  poverty  alleviation.  An  intellectual  consensus  on  this  is 
prevented  by  the  continuing  adherence  of  most  of  the  Western  "chattering 
classes"  to  the  notion  of  the  State  as  an  enterprise  association  which  they 
would  like  to  use  to  promote  their  socialist  ideal  of  some form  of  egalitar- 
ianism.  Hopefully,  however,  socialists  who  in  the  past  have  worshipped  the 
God of  History,  will  learn  its  lessons.  They  will  come to  realize  that,  not 
only  the  communist  command economy,  but  also  the  social  democratic  welfare 
state  are  goda  that  failed! 32 
NOTES 
1 The  studies  in  the  series  entitled  "The  Political  Economy  of  Poverty 
Equity  and  Growth."  edited  by  D.  La1  and  H.  Myint,  and  published  for  the 
World  Bank  by  OUP, New York  are:  Malawi  and  Madagascar  (Pryor,  1990);  Egypt 
and  Turkey  (Hansen,  1991);  Sri  Lanka  and  Malaysia  (Bruton,  1992);  Brazil  and 
Mexico  (Maddison  et  al.,  1992);  Costa  Rica  and  Uruguay  (Rottenberg  et  al., 
1993);  five  small  economies  --  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Malta,  Jamaica  and 
Mauritius  (Findlay  and  Wellisz,  1993);  Indonesia  and  Nigeria  (Bevan,  Collier 
and  Gunning,  in  press,  1993).  In  addition  a  study  of  Ghana  (Rimmer,  in 
press,  1993)  is  to  be  published  by  Pergamon  press  and  of  Thailand  (Meesook 
et  al.,  forthcoming)  by  the  World  Bank.  The  study  of  Colombia  and  Peru  Z 
(Urdinola,  Serrano  and  Webb,  1990)  is  available  in  mimeo  form  from  the 
Bank's  Latin  American  department.  A  collection  of  specially  commissioned 
essays  on  cross-country  themes  was  published  by  Pergamon  (Pscharopolous, 
1991).  Finally  the  synthesis  volume  of  the  comparative  study  is  being 
published  by  the  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford  (Lal-Myint,  in  press). 
2But  see  Sen  (1976),  Kakwani  (1980),  Ravallion  (1992).  The  serious 
data  problems  in  making  intercountry  comparisons  of  changes  in  living  stand- 
ards  should  also  be  noted.  In  an  overview  of  the  findings  of  a  conference 
on  the  data  base  for  development  analysis,  Srinivasan  recently  concluded: 
"the  situation  with  respect  to  the  quality,  coverage,  intertemporal  and 
international  comparability  of  published  data  on  vital  aspects  of  the 
development  process  is  still  abysmal  in  spite  of  decades  of  efforts  at 
improvements".  He  is  particularly  critical  of  the  spurious  sense  of 
"reliability,  comprehensiveness  and  comparability"  created  by  the  data 33 
published  by  various  international  agencies,  which  rarely  point  out  the 
serious  deficiencies  in  their  reported  numbers.  Thus  he  notes: 
seven  out  of  180  less  developed  countries  have  not  held  a 
population  census  as  yet  and  for  22  the  date  of  the  most  recent 
census  is  prior  to  1975.  Relatively  reliable  and  recent  . . . 
[later  than  19801  data  for  estimating  life  expectancy  at  birth 
(infant  mortality)  are  not  available  for  as  many  as  87(65)  out  of 
117  less  developed  countries.  . . .  Given  this  issue  it  is  nothing 
short  of  scandalous  that  the  much  touted  Human Development  Report 
of  the  UNDP  not  only  does  not  inform  its  readers  that  the  trends 
in  life  expectancy  and  the  Human Development  Index  are  based  on 
guesses  for  countries  for  which  no  reliable  data  exist  and  dubious 
projections  for  countries  for  which  the  most  recent  data  on  life 
expectancy  goes  back  to  1979  or  earlier. 
Nor  are  the  published  national  income  and  GDP growth  rate  figures  any 
better.  Thus  he  notes: 
According  to  the  World  Bank's  "World  Development  Indicators"  1992, 
Table  1,  in  1990  India  and  China  had  GNP per  capita  of  U.S.  $350 
and  U.S.  $370  respectively  and  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of 
GNP per  capita  during  1965-90  was  1.9%  in  India  and  5.5%  in  China. 
Taken  together  these  levels  and  rates  of  growth  would  imply  that 
China's  per  capita  GNP was  about  40% of  India's  in  1965!  No 
knowledgeable  observer  of  the  two  countries  would  subscribe  to 
this  ranking. 
I 
I 
Given  these  serious  statistical  problems  the  Lal-Myint  study  was  designed  to 
rely  on  in  depth  historical  country  studies  as  the  basis  for  the  cross- 
country  inferences  that  were  made,  rather  than  the  type  of  statistical 
cross-sectional  studies  which  have  recently  proliferated  in  the  development 
literature.  Apart  from  the  serious  problems  concerning  the  non-robustness 
of  the  estimated  regressions  (see  Levine  & Renelt  (1992)),  and  the  absurdity 
of  giving  an  "observation"  say  Chad,  the  same weight  as  India  or  China,  the 
fragility  of  the  underlying  data  sets  that  are  used  makes  most  of  this  work 
unpersuasive. 
3  As  Himmelfarb  (1983)  notes: 
. . .  "ye  have  the  poor  always  with  you".  That  thought  came  echoing 
down  through  the  centuries  with  the  authority  of  Scripture  and  the 
practical  wisdom  of  the  ages.  And  with  it  came a  complicated- 34 
ambivalent,  we would  now  think  of  it-conception  of  poverty,  which 
made  it  at  the  same time  a  blessing  to  be  devoutly  sought  and  a 
misfortune  to  be  piously  endured.  . . .  Those  who were  blessed  not 
with  poverty  but  with  riches  had  the  sacred  duty  of  charity,  the 
obligation  to  sustain  the  holy  poor  and  to  relieve  the  misery  of 
the  unholy.  With  every  aspect  of  poverty  and  charity  penetrated 
by  religious  meaning,  the  church  inevitably  became  the  instrument 
both  of  social  amelioration  and  of  spiritual  salvation;  indeed  the 
one  was  the  function  of  the  other.  (pp.  3-4) 
4The  "World  Development  Report  1990"  estimated  that  of  the  1,116 
million  in  poverty  worldwide  (i.e.,  with  a  per  capita  consumption  of  less 
than  U.S.  $370  in  1985PPP)  700  million  were  accounted  for  by  South  Asia  and 
sub-saharan  Africa.  Of  the  633  million  globally  in  extreme  poverty  (per 
capita  consumption  of  less  than  $275)  an  even  higher  proportion  (520 
million)  were  in  these  two  regions.  For  South  Asia,  particularly  in  India, 
the  major  cause  of  continuing  mass  structural  poverty  is  a  low  growth  rate,-' 
which  in  turn  has  been  caused  by  its  dirigiste  policies  (see  La1  (1989)). 
Whilst  in  Africa  its  continuing  endemic  structural  poverty  is  due  to  the 
neglect  of  the  rural  countryside  (see  Collier  and  La1  (1986)).  As  Ilife 
summarizing  the  evidence  on  the  causes  of  African  structural  poverty 
concludes,  it  was  the  progressive  deterioration  of  the  rural-urban  terms  of 
trade  which  led  to  "the  steady  drainage  of  cash  from  the  countryside  [and] 
was  the  continent's  main  cause  of  poverty".  This  in  turn  was  due  to  the 
well-known  urban  bias  of  African  development  policy  "  which  bred 
unprofitable  enterprises,  heavy  recurrent  costs,  unpayable  debts  and 
exploited  villagers". 
5  Himmelfarb  notes  that  by  the  end  of  the  18th  century  the  distinction 
between  the  indigent  and  the  poor  had  become  clearly  established,  and  cites 
a  succinct  formulation  by  Patrick  Colloquhon  in  1799: 
Indigence  therefore,  and  not  poverty,  is  the  evil.  It  is  that 
condition  in  society  which  implies  want,  misery,  and  distress.  It 35 
is  the  state  of  anyone  who  is  destitute  of  the  means  of  subsist- 
ence ,  and  is  unable  to  labor  or  procure  it  to  the  extent  nature 
requires.  The  natural  source  of  subsistence  is  the  labor  of  the 
individual;  while  that  remains  with  him  he  is  denominated  poor; 
when  it  fails  in  whole  or  in  part  he  becomes  indigent. 
(cited  in  Himmelfarb  (1983),  p.  78) 
6  Increasing  destitution  has  been  due  to  political  violence  in  post- 
colonial  Africa,and  not  to  the  cyclical  climatic  factors  which  have  always 
put  some Africans  (particularly  pastoralists)  at  risk.  The  various  civil 
wars  in  Africa  have  created  12  million  "mass  distress  migrants"  between 
1964-84  (R.  Olivier,  review  of  Ilife,  TLS,  27  May  1987). 
7  Some dirigistes  have  evoked  Adam Smith  to  their  cause  by  pointing  to 
the  so-called  "Adam  Smith  problem",  where  the  individualism  underlying  T& 
Wealth  of  Nations  is  contrasted  with  the  altruism  extolled  as  the  supreme  _* 
virtue  in  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments.  It  being  claimed  that  Smith  the 
moral  philosopher  seems  to  condemn  the  very  society  that  Smith  the  economist 
commended.  In  an  important  book  Muller  (1992)  has  shown  that  there  is  no 
such  incoherence  in  Smith's  work.  The  above  remarks  on  the  Scottish 
Enlightenment's  views  on  ethics  and  economics  are  based  on  this  work. 
8  UNICEF  (1984)  and  Jolly  and  Corvia  (1984)  have  maintained  that  the 
various  macroeconomic  adjustment  programs  undertaken  to  repair  the  damage 
done  by  past  dirigisme  have  damaged the  prospects  of  the  poor.  Behrman 
(1991)  examined  this  issue  for  the  Lal-Myint  study.  He  concluded: 
UNICEF  and  others  have  made  strong  claims  about  negative 
multiplier  effects  of  macro-economic  adjustment  policies  on  health 
and  nutrition.  Careful  examination  of  the  relevant  studies, 
however,  suggests  that  the  empirical  basis  for  such  a  claim 
currently  is  weak.  In  fact  the  underlying  studies  seem  to  be 
characterized  better  as  reflecting  how well  societies  and  people 
have  adapted  to  minimize  negative  health  and  nutrition  effects 
rather  than  the  more  negative  interpretation  given  by  UNICEF. 
(Behnnan  (1991)) 36 
9  The  Catholic  social  scientist  Michael  Novak  has  been  one  of  the  most 
trenchant  observers  of  the  moral  corruption  engendered  by  the  welfare  state. 
In  a  recent  lecture  (Novak  (1993))  he  notes  that  by  ceding  too  much  author- 
ity  to  the  collective  the  welfare  state  saps  the  personal  sense  of 
responsibility.  "We come to  feel  [by  a  multitude  of  rationalizations]  that 
the  state  'owes'  us  benefits,  that  we  are  as  'entitled'  to  them  as  anybody 
else,  and  that  we would  be  foolish  not  to  take  what  is  so  abundantly  offered 
whether,  strictly,  we need  it  or  not.  The  welfare  state  corrupts  us  all" 
(P.  5).  He  cites  evidence  from  the  Netherlands  for  instance  where  "about 
15% of  the  potential  workforce  is  collecting  disability  under  a  generous 
system  that  has  granted  workers  a  net  80% of  their  take-home  salaries  for 
life.  . . .  One-third  of  the  disability  inflow  is  because  of  psychological 
v- 
problems.  Another  third  is  because  of  back-  problems,  which  are  sometimes 
questionable"  (ibid.  p.  14)! 
10  This  is  based  on  Joyce  (1993). 37 
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